The Rumsfeld Doctrine

Back in the mists of time there was a website called Geeks Against Bush, founded by friends and me, trying to write about politics from a liberal (for me at least not yet “leftist”) but techie point of view. I wrote a lot of posts there, but sometime after Obama got elected, Caleb stopped renewing the domain, and the posts all fell off the internet. But the one I am most proud of was my post about then-Defense-Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s cynical and heartless military doctrine.

I’m in the process of going back over my backlog and updating the links, and I managed to find the text of my original post about The Rumsfeld Doctrine on the Wayback Machine. Below you can find the full text.

The links below may or may not work, though, as of this posting. I’ll need to update them, I’m sure.

Nothing is ever really gone on the internet, after all.

The Rumsfeld Doctrine
By Brian Moon
12/11/2004

Prior to 2000, the predominant politco-military doctrine was known as the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, developed by Casper Weinberger (Secretary of Defense under Reagan) and adopted and developed further under Colin Powell.

Enunciation of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine:

  1. commit only if our or our allies’ vital interests are at stake;
  2. if we commit, do with all the resources necessary to win;
  3. go in with clear political and military objectives;
  4. be ready to change the commitment if the objectives change;
  5. only take on commitments that can gain the support of the American people and Congress;
  6. commit U.S. forces only as a last resort.

Rumsfeld had long sought the opportunity to remake the military in his own image, as discussed by analyst James Pinkerton in November 2001:

“For three decades now, Rumsfeld has emphasized the need for such traditional politico-military virtues as planning and patience. Now he is adding the additional concept, also drawn from history, of “difference.” And so a new doctrine, a Rumsfeld Doctrine, is emerging: do everything you need to do first, taking as much time as you need. Then you can be certain of one thing: ultimate triumph. No matter how “different” the war proves to be.”

And, with a new regime in the second Bush administration and the appointment of a new Secretary of Defense, Don Rumsfeld was able to finally put into effect his own strategies for troop deployment and military development. But it remained theoretical until the attacks of 9/11, which brought the chance for actualization. Shortly after 9/11, when the administration announced that we would be chasing Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, Mr. Pinkerton quoted Rumsfeld as saying,

“Even the vocabulary of this war will be different. When we ‘invade the enemy`s territory,’ we may well be invading his cyberspace. There may not be as many beachheads stormed as opportunities denied. Forget about ‘exit strategies’; we’re looking at a sustained engagement that carries no deadlines. We have no fixed rules about how to deploy our troops; we`ll instead establish guidelines to determine whether military force is the best way to achieve a given objective.”

The differences between the two doctrines are sharp, as Michael O’Hanlon wrote in the Financial Times:

“They also suggest that the doctrine of overwhelming force espoused by Colin Powell, secretary of state, will soon be replaced by a new Rumsfeld doctrine emphasising [sic] high technology, special operations units and sheer brainpower to defeat future foes.”

Rumsfeld is a technocrat, wanting to build an Army of One, armed with amazing tools and weapons, light, mobile, and incredibly flexible and intelligent, able to adapt to a rapidly-changing situation and respond with just the right move.

Afghanistan was the first test. With the world sympathy on our side (not that the Rumsfeld Doctrine called for it; that was old school thinking), we deployed overwhelming air strikes and small teams of commandoes into the mountains, searching for a single target: Osama bin Laden. Pundits everywhere declared the war a victory.

Except, of course, for the small, obviously unimportant factor that we failed in the one mission objective. Osama bin Laden remains at large. Other than that, well, of course it was a success. Apparently the objective shifted; the administration had to find another guideline, as suggested by the Rumsfeld Doctrine.

Iraq provided the second opportunity for Mr. Rumsfeld to apply his doctrine. By the time we invaded Iraq, Rumsfeld had had nearly 3 years to remake our nation’s military might to match his vision. The attacks in Afghanistan were done on a moment’s notice. Rumsfeld’s planning and patience were short circuited by the need to respond quickly after the terrorist attacks on our country. Iraq would represent the perfect application of the Rumsfeld Doctrine in action. The administration had the support of Congress, and the support of the rest of the world was unnecessary under the new rules. With a Republican-controlled Congress, surely funding was at an all-time high. All of the factors were in place.

And what do we have, a year after the initial invasion?

We have troops that leave tons of ammunition unguarded for lack of time and manpower; ammunition that later turns up missing.

We have troops dying and fighting to rout insurgents from Fallujah — a city our troops passed through (but were unable to secure due to lack of manpower and orders to advance on Baghdad) in the initial invasion.

We have the Army using every legal trick in its books to hold on to the soldiers they have, with the infamous “stop loss” — where a soldier whose contract has expired is unable to leave while his unit is deployed in combat situations. The Army Reserve is also increasingly denying retirement to officers except in “extraordinary situations”.

And most importantly, we have troops without the basic protection they need. We have troops facing court martial for refusing to perform their missions for lack of armor. We have brave soldiers like Specialist Thomas Wilson openly asking the Secretary of Defense about the lack of armor. Secretary Rumsfeld was in Kuwait for a town-hall type meeting and one of the first questions (but by no means the only pointed question) was from Spc. Wilson. Please note that Spc. Wilson was not a lone wolf; the other soldiers cheered when he asked the question.

And what was Donald Rumsfeld’s response? After a stalling technique of asking him to repeat the question, Rumsfeld reportedly said:

“You go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you might want or wish to have.”

Mr. Rumsfeld has had years in order to create the Army he wants. He was speaking to the men and women whose lives he and the rest of the administration has pledged to this war, a war of choice not of need. And he insults them to their face with a dismissal of their concerns.

After hearing his callous words thrown back at him, Mr. Rumsfeld and his boss tried to soft-pedal his grave abuse of power and trust by suggesting that the administration and the Pentagon were doing everything they could to supply our troops with the equipment they need. But is that true?

A reporter spoke to the sole company in Florida that produces armored Humvees, Armor Holdings, Inc., and found that they could increase their output by more than 100 vehicles per month, with no further investment. The company only awaits an order for that additional armor. Meanwhile, Spc. Wilson and his fellow soldiers are scrounging trash heaps and dumps for used plating and compromised bulletproof glass in order to carry them on their missions. Other military suppliers are reporting similar stories — they’ve told the purchasers at the Pentagon that they stand ready to provide more, but the requests have fallen on deaf ears.

Let’s get this straight. All the complaints from the left or anti-war people, while good intentioned, are misguided. Or, worse, they are missing the point.

It’s not the money that’s preventing our troops from getting the equipment they require.

Our soldiers are going into battle, in a hostile territory, with exactly what Rumsfeld wants them to have. This is not a failure of planning and preparation. This is the result of Rumsfeld’s planning and preparation. He doesn’t care if they live or die. He only cares about keeping hold of the reins of power, of carving out his place in history, as does most of the Bush II administration.

That is the Rumsfeld Doctrine.

  1. Keep the country on a wartime footing by instituting continuous warfare;
  2. with states chosen for their symbolic significance rather than political, military or economic interests;
  3. use language that suggests support for the troops, and actions that counter that, because citizens only listen to the language;
  4. if soldiers rebel, turn the volunteer army into a sham;
  5. if the soldiers complain, it’s because they’re whiners, not because of poor oversight or planning on the leader’s part;
  6. and the leaders are not held accountable for their actions. Ever.

Welcome to warfare, 21st-Century style.